David’s Brief Brexit Blog

The 2016 mandate has timed out

My letter in the Observer of 23rd September 2018 (second one on the page) shows that the change in our electorate since June 2016 is far greater than the 2016 majority for leaving the EU.

Click here to see a diagrammatic explantion of why we no longer know
“the will of the people”.

If the will of the people is important we need to ask them again, no matter which side of the debate you are on.

Boris’s Valentine Message

On Valentine’s Day 2018 Boris Johnson gave a speech in which he said “The British people voted to take back control”. He also said that there would be no second referendum.

He seemed not to notice the stark contradiction in these two statements.

No mandate for hard Brexit

There is no mandate for hard Brexit — quite the opposite. Let us look properly at the 23 June result in the light of the current debate.

The choice between in or out for the European Economic Area (EEA) is just as important as in or out for the EU, and is just as deserving of a public vote as the 23 June referendum. The correct approach would have been to have a 3-way choice.
  1. Status quo - i.e. remain
  2. Leave EU but stay in EEA -- i.e. soft brexit
  3. Leave EU and leave EEA -- i.e. hard brexit
If we try to predict how the voters of 23 June would have responded to such a choice, there is no reasonable interpretation that gives victory to the hard brexit camp.

If voters had been offered this 3-way choice, the leave vote would been split, and remain would have been first-past-the-post. The Brexiters would rightly have called foul and that second preferences should also count in the way that they elected Boris to to be Mayor of London. So we have two possibilities after the first round. If the hard vote is less than the soft vote, the hard camp is eliminated and their second preferences are used, which would surely all go to soft, which then wins with exactly the margin as on 23 June. If hard gets more first votes than soft, then soft is eliminated. It is inconceivable that all the second preferences in the soft camp are for hard, and only a small number of such second preferences for remain is sufficient to give victory to remain. Even if in such a 3-way vote some who voted remain on 23 June had soft as their first choice and remain as second, it makes no difference at all.

So there is absolutely no mandate for a hard brexit, and as our prime minister should have said “Brexit means our Botched Referendum Empowered Xenophobic Isolationist Tories.”

So in all probability the vote on 23 June was for soft brexit, or possibly remain. There is no plausible way in which it can be interpreted as in favour of hard brexit. What if the remaining EU members will not countenance soft Brexit. Then we go back and eliminate soft and use their second preferences -- so we remain.

There is no mandate for hard brexit -- none at all.

The original act calling the referendum was bad legislation, limiting the electorate’s right to express a view on the issue. As the government seems determined to press obdurately for a hard brexit, Parliament should insist on a second referendum with the 3 choice structure. The original Act enabling the referendum was bad law, as was the Poll Tax, and like the Poll Tax it could be over-ridden.

Referendum too close to call

Before making a bonfire of our EU membership, please ponder that if the fire brigade wanted a mandate for a strike, they would need to have 40% of their members voting in favour of strike action.

Just let’s look at the numbers:
  • In favour of Brexit: 37.5%
  • In favour of Remain: 34.7%
  • Not voting: 27.8%
Statistically the result was a tie.

Not only does a public sector strike vote need 40% in favour, so did the 1979 referendum. It was very foolish to conduct a referendum on such a weighty matter without a threshold requirement. The only sensible policy is to stick with the status quo for a year or so, develop some proper policies to use outside the EU, and then run another referendum. The current leap in the dark with no clear trade deals is folly. We do not even know whether the government intends that we become part of the European Economic Area.
B otched
R eferendum
E nables
X enophobic
I solationists’
T riumph
Matters are made worse by the sudden disappearance of Leave Campaign promises after the referendum, and Farage is on record as saying that a 52-48 vote would not be the end of the matter.
( Click here and here) For once it is possible to agree with Farage

Numbers

Here are some plausible numbers, and then an algebraic presentation for those (like me) who do not like guesswork.

This is the actual result:
Pro Hard Brexit Pro Soft Brexit Pro Remain Not voting
37.5% 34.7% 27.8%
This is what happens if hard gets eliminated
Pro Hard Brexit Pro Soft Brexit Pro Remain Not voting
18.5% 19% 34.7% 27.8%
Assume that the second choice of pro-hard is pro-soft, and we get the original result but this time for soft.
Pro Hard Brexit Pro Soft Brexit Pro Remain Not voting
eliminated 37.5% 34.7% 27.8%
This is what happens if soft gets eliminated
Pro Hard Brexit Pro Soft Brexit Pro Remain Not voting
19% 18.5% 34.7% 27.8%
It is reasonable to assume that the second choice of pro-soft is split between hard and remain. Even if the second choices of the 34.7% who voted leave were to split 2% remain and 32.7% hard, we get
Pro Hard Brexit Pro Soft Brexit Pro Remain Not voting
35.5% eliminated 36.7% 27.8%
In all probability the split within the soft faction would be closer than this. Hard can only win if of the 37.5% voting leave fewer thatn 1.4% had remain as their second choice.
Algebraic version to come — maybe

Well, actually the use of algebra may make this look too much like the work of experts, of whom we are told we have had enough. So I will hold off the mathematics for the moment.